Structural explanations lead young children and adults to rectify resource inequalities.

Decisions about how to divide resources have profound social and practical consequences. Do explanations regarding the source of existing inequalities influence how children and adults allocate new resources? When 3- to 6-year-old children (N = 201) learned that inequalities were caused by structural forces (stable external constraints affecting access to resources) as opposed to internal forces (effort), they rectified inequalities, overriding previously documented tendencies to perpetuate inequality or divide resources equally. Adults (N = 201) were more likely than children to rectify inequality spontaneously; this was further strengthened by a structural explanation but reversed by an effort-based explanation. Allocation behaviors were mirrored in judgments of which allocation choices by others were appropriate. These findings reveal how explanations powerfully guide social reasoning and action from childhood through adulthood.

Children's use of pragmatic inference to learn about the social world.

Young children often endorse stereotypes-such as "girls are bad at math." We explore one mechanism through which these beliefs may be transmitted: via pragmatic inference. Specifically, we ask whether preschoolers and adults can learn about an unmentioned social group from what is said about another group, and if this inferential process is sensitive to the context of the utterance. Sixty-three- to five-year-old children and fifty-five adults were introduced to two novel social groups-Stripeys and Dotties-and witnessed a speaker praising abilities of one group (e.g., "the Stripeys are good at building chairs"). To examine the effect of context, we compared situations where the speaker was knowledgeable about the abilities of both groups, and had been queried about the performance of both groups (broad context), versus situations where the speaker was only knowledgeable about one group and was only asked about that group (narrow context). Both preschoolers and adults were sensitive to context: they were more likely to infer that the group not mentioned by the speaker was relatively unskilled, and were more confident about it, in the broad context condition. Our work integrates research in language development and social cognitive development and demonstrates that even young children can "read between the lines," utilizing subtle contextual cues to pick up negative evaluative messages about social groups even from statements that ostensibly do not mention them at all. HIGHLIGHTS: After hearing a speaker praise one group's skill, preschoolers and adults infer that an unmentioned group is relatively less skilled across a range of measures. These inferences are context-sensitive and are stronger when the speaker is knowledgeable of and asked about both groups' skill level. These results shed light on how children may indirectly learn negative stereotypes, especially ones that adults are unlikely to state explicitly. This work extends previous research on children's developing pragmatic ability, as well as their ability to learn about the social world from language.

Explanations and Causal Judgments Are Differentially Sensitive to Covariation and Mechanism Information.

Are causal explanations (e.g., "she switched careers because of the COVID pandemic") treated differently from the corresponding claims that one factor caused another (e.g., "the COVID pandemic caused her to switch careers")? We examined whether explanatory and causal claims diverge in their responsiveness to two different types of information: covariation strength and mechanism information. We report five experiments with 1,730 participants total, showing that compared to judgments of causal strength, explanatory judgments tend to be more sensitive to mechanism and less sensitive to covariation - even though explanatory judgments respond to both types of information. We also report exploratory comparisons to judgments of understanding, and discuss implications of our findings for theories of explanation, understanding, and causal attribution. These findings shed light on the potentially unique role of explanation in cognition.